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Abstract
I argue that the current financial crisis highlights the crucial need
of a change of mindset in economics and financial engineering, that
should move away from dogmatic axioms and focus more on data,
orders of magnitudes, and plausible, albeit non rigorous, arguments.
An edited version of this essay appeared in Nature.
Compared to physics, it seems fair to say that the quantitative success of
the economic sciences is disappointing. Rockets fly to the moon, energy is
extracted from minute changes of atomic mass without major havoc, global
positioning satellites help millions of people to find their way home. What is
the flagship achievement of economics, apart from its recurrent inability to
predict and avert crises, including the current worldwide credit crunch?
Why is this so? Of course, modelling the madness of people is more dif-
ficult than the motion of planets, as Newton once said. But the goal here is
to describe the behaviour of large populations, for which statistical regulari-
ties should emerge, just as the law of ideal gases emerge from the incredibly
chaotic motion of individual molecules. To me, the crucial difference be-
tween physical sciences and economics or financial mathematics is rather the
relative role of concepts, equations and empirical data. Classical economics
is built on very strong assumptions that quickly become axioms: the ratio-
nality of economic agents, the invisible hand and market efficiency, etc. An
economist once told me, to my bewilderment: These concepts are so strong
that they supersede any empirical observation. As Robert Nelson argued in
his book, Economics as Religion, the marketplace has been deified.
Physicists, on the other hand, have learned to be suspicious of axioms
and models. If empirical observation is incompatible with the model, the
model must be trashed or amended, even if it is conceptually beautiful or
mathematically convenient. So many accepted ideas have been proven wrong
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in the history of physics that physicists have grown to be critical and queasy
about their own models. Unfortunately, such healthy scientific revolutions
have not yet taken hold in economics, where ideas have solidified into dog-
mas, that obsess academics as well as decision-makers high up in government
agencies and financial institutions. These dogmas are perpetuated through
the education system: teaching reality, with all its subtleties and exceptions,
is much harder than teaching a beautiful, consistent formula. Students do not
question theorems they can use without thinking. Though scores of physi-
cists have been recruited by financial institutions over the last few decades,
these physicists seem to have forgotten the methodology of natural sciences
as they absorbed and regurgitated the existing economic lore, with no time
or liberty to question its foundations.
The supposed omniscience and perfect efficacy of a free market stems
from economic work in the 50s and 60s, which with hindsight looks more
like propaganda against communism than a plausible scientific description.
In reality, markets are not efficient, humans tend to be over-focused in the
short-term and blind in the long-term, and errors get amplified through so-
cial pressure and herding, ultimately leading to collective irrationality, panic
and crashes. Free markets are wild markets. It is foolish to believe that
the market can impose its own self-discipline, as was promoted by the US
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004 when it allowed banks to pile
up new debt.
Reliance on models based on incorrect axioms has clear and large effects.
The Black-Scholes model was invented in 1973 to price options assuming
that price changes have a Gaussian distribution, i.e. the probability ex-
treme events is deemed negligible. Twenty years ago, unwarranted use of the
model to hedge the downfall risk on stock markets spiraled into the October
1987 crash: -23% drop in a single day, dwarfing the recent hiccups of the
markets. Ironically, it is the very use of the crash-free Black-Scholes model
that destabilized the market! This time around, the problem lay in part in
the development of structured financial products that packaged sub-prime
risk into seemingly respectable high-yield investments. The models used to
price them were fundamentally flawed: they underestimated the probability
of that multiple borrowers would default on their loans simultaneously. In
other words, these models again neglected the very possibility of a global
crisis, even as they contributed to triggering one. The financial engineers
who developed these models did not even realize that they helped the credit
mongers of the financial industry to smuggle their products worldwide – they
were not trained to decipher what their assumptions really meant.
Surprisingly, there is no framework in classical economics to understand
wild markets, even though their existence is so obvious to the layman. Physics,
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on the other hand, has developed several models allowing one to understand
how small perturbations can lead to wild effects. The theory of complex-
ity, developed in the physics literature over the last thirty years, shows that
although a system may have an optimum state (such as a state of lowest en-
ergy, for example), it is sometimes so hard to identify that the system in fact
never settles there. This optimal solution is not only elusive, it is also hyper-
fragile to small changes in the environment, and therefore often irrelevant
to understanding what is going on. There are good reasons to believe that
this complexity paradigm should apply to economic systems in general and
financial markets in particular. Simple ideas of equilibrium and linearity (the
assumption that small actions produce small effects) do not work. We need
to break away from classical economics and develop altogether new tools, as
attempted in a still patchy and disorganized way by ‘behavioral economists
and ‘econophysicists. But their fringe endeavour is not taken seriously by
mainstream economics.
While work is done to improve models, regulation also needs to im-
prove. Innovations in financial products should be scrutinized, crash tested
against extreme scenarios and approved by independent agencies, just as we
have done with other potentially lethal industries (chemical, pharmaceutical,
aerospace, nuclear energy, etc.). In view of the present mayhem spilling over
from the financial industry into every day life, a parallel with these other
dangerous human activities seems relevant.
Most of all, there is a crucial need to change the mindset of those work-
ing in economics and financial engineering. They need to move away from
what Richard Feynman called Cargo Cult Science: a science that follows all
the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, while still missing
something essential. An overly formal and dogmatic education in the eco-
nomic sciences and financial mathematics are part of the problem. Economic
curriculums need to include more natural science. The prerequisites for more
stability in the long run are the development of a more pragmatic and real-
istic representation of what is going on in financial markets, and to focus on
data, which should always supersede perfect equations and aesthetic axioms.
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